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Abstract Implementation of Individtuil vessel quotas (IVQsj in the British
Cott<mbia halihiii fishery has provided a unique opportunity to examine the
effects of this management technique on a previously intense "derby" fishery.
This paper describes (he chanj^es thai have occurred in the fishery since the
introduction of individual vessel quotas in 1991. The restdts presented here are
largely based on the fmdinfis of two surveys. In September 1993. we cotiducled
in-depth interviews with most of the major luilibul processors in British Co-
lumbia. These processors reported significant changes in the processinf> and
marketing of halibut. In Spring 1994, we conducted a mail survey of all 435
licensed halibut fishermen. The survey consisted of several series of questions
designed to tneasure changes in ftshmg operations (crew size, fishing prac-
tices, etc.). quota leasing activities, changes in fishing imotne. and opinions
abotit the effects oflVQs. The results presented here provide important infor-
mation about the effects of the British Columbia halibut IV Q program to date
and will be useful for comparison to similar management programs imple-
mented elsewhere.
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Introduction
Managing a fishery through individual transferable quotas (ITQs) involves setting
a total allowable catch (TAC) for a fishery and then allocating shares of the TAC
to individual fishermen. The idea of using ITQs in fishery management originated
from Christy (1973). Christy proposed ITQs as a means of improving efficiency in
a fully or over utilized fishery. In subsequent more formal analysis, economists
argue ITQs can improve efficiency in fisheries regulated by a total allowable catch
by eliminating the "rule of capture'" externality (Boyce 1992). Simply stated, the
"rule of capture" externality pertains to the incentive fishermen have to compete
for shares of a TAC. Since ownership of fish doesn't occur until capture, the
harvest of one vessel imposes an externality on all others by reducing the remain-
ing TAC. In such a situation, each fisher has an incentive to over-capitalize in
vessel, crew, and gear in order to compete in the "race for fish". By providing
ownership of fish prior to capture, ITQs eliminate the "rule of capture" exter-
nality and the over-capitalization incentive associated with it. However, as shown
by Boyce, ITQs do not eliminate over-capitalization problems stemming from
stock and congestion externalities.
While a considerable amount of literature exists speculating on how quota
programs might operate in theory (Copes 1986, Moloney and Pearse 1979, Pearse
and Wilen 1979, Campbell 1984, and Clark 1986). there is less concrete informa-
tion assessing how they work in real settings. Various forms of individual quota
systems have been implemented in New Zealand, Australia, Iceland, Canada, and
the United States. Currently, there are over 40 individual quota programs oper-
ating in fisheries around the world, each with different design characteristics
operating in different circumstances with respect to biology, fishing practices,
management institutions, etc. Hence, there is accumulating evidence with which
to evaluate the effectiveness of individual quotas as a management tool. Dewees
(1989), Boyd and Dewees (1992), Sissenwine and Mace (1992) have examined the
changes brought about by the ITQ programs operating in New Zealand. Similar
studies have been done for individual quota programs in the U.S. Wreckfish
fishery (Gauvin et al. 1994), the Southern bluefin tuna fishery (Geen and Nayar
1988). and the Icelandic fisheries (Arnason 1993).
In May 1991, Canada implemented a two-year experimental Individual vessel
quota system (IVQs) for the British Columbia halibut fishery. This system became
permanent in 1993. Prior to the IVQ program, the British Columbia halibut fishery
operated as a classic "derby" style fishery where each year fishermen had two to
three short openings in which to harvest the TAC. This paper describes the
changes that have occurred in the British Columbia halibut fishery since the
introduction of an individual vessel quota program in 1991. We begin with an
overview of the North Pacific halibut fishery describing the resource, fishing fleet,
processing sector, and management history. Next, we describe the impetus for
British Columbia's halibut IVQ program, the development process, and the pro-
gram's design features. We then describe and assess the changes that have oc-
curred in the fishery since the IVQ program was implemented in 1991 beginning
with changes in ex-vessel prices and landing patterns followed by a more micro
level description of specific changes in the processing and fishing sectors. We
summarize our results in the final section and conclude with some thoughts about
likely future changes."IVQs in the B.C. Halibut Fishery" 213
Overview
The Fishery
The Pacific halibut fishery is one of the oldest fisheries on the west coast of North
America and is exploited commercially by both the U.S. and Canada. Pacific
halibut {Hippoglossus stenolepis) are flatfish found on sandy bottoms in the
coastal waters of the Pacific Northwest, ranging from northern California to the
Bering Sea. Halibut populations are most heavily concentrated in the more north-
ern regions off of British Columbia and Alaska. They are a long lived species and
may attain sizes up to 500 pounds in fish over 100 years old (Bell 1981). More
typical ranges in the modem exploited fishery span 10 to 60 pounds. Halibut
generally recruit to the fishery at an age of about eight years.
The directed fishery for halibut is hook and line. Almost all of the halibut is
captured with longline gear and a small percentage is taken by troll gear. Halibut
fishing vessels average between 40 and 60 feet in length and are used in other
fisheries such as salmon and herring. Prior to IVQs. a very common fishing
pattern for a British Columbia halibut fishermen was to gillnet (or seine) for
roe-herring in early spring, switch to longline gear for the May halibut opening,
switch to troll gear for the salmon season (July through August), and switch back
to long line gear for a September halibut opening. U.S. halibut vessels follow
similar patterns. There is. however, a fieet of large longline boats based in Seattle
that longline throughout the year, targeting halibut and sablefish during designated
area openings and groundfish at other times of the year.
Most of the firms processing halibut handle a variety of other fish species,
predominately salmon with some firms also processing groundfish, sablefish, and
herring. Halibut is almost always sold in the primary wholesale market as a whole,
head-off, and gutted fish with filleting and steaking generally done by secondary
wholesale distributors and retailers. The majority of U.S. caught halibut is sold
frozen. This was also true for British Columbia prior to the IVQ program. Under
the IVQ program, almost all of British Columbia's halibut is sold fresh. The
United States and Canada are the main markets for halibut with the U.S. having
the largest market share. There is also a small market for Pacific halibut in parts
of Europe and Japan.
Regulatory Structure
The commercial harvest of pacific halibut is regulated by three organizations. The
governments of the two countries set regulations for halibut harvested within their
respective territorial waters and an international council called the International
Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) sets regulations applicable to both territorial
waters. Regulations set by the IPHC deal almost exclusively with conservation
issues. In particular, this agency is charged with setting area-specific fishing sea-
sons and TACs. It also sets minimum size limits and restrictions on harvest
methods. Both U.S. and Canadian governments can introduce additional regula-
tions to the fishery provided those regulations are more restrictive than the con-
servation measures developed by the IPHC. Figure 1 displays the delineation of
fishing areas. Area 2B is defined as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of British214 Casey, Dewees, Turris, and Wilen
Columbia. The U.S. halibutgroundsarecomprisedof many fishing areas, with the
most productive areas located in the Gulf of Alaska (Areas 2C, 3A, 3B).
Each year the IPHC reviews stock assessments for each fishing area and
assigns each area a TAC along with specific dates for taking the TAC. Major
area openings during the early 1980s typically lasted two weeks. However, in-
creased fishing pressure, arising from greater effort and improved harvesting
technology, have led to area TACs being reached must faster. In order to pre-
vent TACs from being exceeded, area openings became shorter each year dur-
ing the 1980"s to the point where major areas were oniy open for one to two days.
In an effort to prevent large gluts of halibut coming into the market at once, the
IPHC staggers fishing area openings starting in May and ending in September with
major area openings occurring before and after salmon season (July through Au-
gust).
Prior to adopting an individual quota system in I99I, the Brifish Columbia
halibut fishery operated under a limited-entry program (established in 1979) with
435 licensed vessels. Formerly open access, the U.S. halibut fishery began oper-
ating under an IFQ program in 1995. As an open access fishery, the U.S. halibut
fleet was much larger than the B.C. fleet with three to four thousand vessels
participating in the fishery each year. During the 198O's British Columbia's halibut
fieet harvested approximately 20 percent of the total annual catch of Pacific hal-
ibut and in recent years the percentage has dropped to around 15 percent. While
the U.S. fieet lands about four to five times more halibut than British Columbia,
it has about eight to nine times more vessels participating in the fishery.
The fishing capacity of the B.C. fieet increased dramatically during the 1980"s
despite the limited entry program. Canadian halibut fishermen increased capacity
with larger crews, electronic gear, more efficient circle hooks, automatic baiters,
and hook disgorgers. By 1990 the Canadian fishery had been reduced to six fishing
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British Columbia's IVQ Program: Impetus, Development and Design
By the end of the I980's it was evident to many in the British Columbia industry
and management that the existing management approach was not working. Fish-
ermen fished in hazardous conditions continuously up to 24 hours per day and as
the derbies became shorter, incidents of vessel sinkings, injuries, and loss of life
became more common. The frantic pace of the derbies resulted in significant
quantities of long line gear being left or lost on the fishing grounds. Biologists were
increasingly concerned about the halibut mortality resulting from this abandoned
gear. Fish quality was reduced by improper handling, processing gluts, and the
necessity to freeze and hold the catch over much of the year. Managers were
concerned that the existing system was breaking down in the face of growing
capacity and shorter seasons. During the l980"s the allowable catch was exceeded
in 8 of 10 years in area 2B and the overage in 1990 alone was 10 percent. In
addition, a large amount of bycatch was being discarded and unrecorded for
management purposes. Finally, budget cuts had reduced the ability of the De-
partment of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to monitor the short frenzied season
effectively, and there were rumors of considerable violations of regulations.
In the winter of 1988 and spring of 1989. fishing organizations met to discuss
alternative management methods, including the possibility of an individual quota
(IQ) program, in an initial survey, 77 percent of license holder respondents af-
firmed support for the use of individual quotas to manage the halibut fishery. This
led DFO to facilitate the formation of a Halibut Advisory Board (HAB) to begin
developing an industry designed program. Although the design negotiations were
by no means without controversy and disagreement, by June of 1990 a complete
proposal was developed by HAB, sent to license holders, and supported by a
majority of 70 percent.' The proposal was ardently opposed by large processing
companies and the crew member union.
In November 1990 the Minister of Fisheries announced that the industry's IQ
program would be adopted on a trial basis for the 1991 and 1992 seasons. The key
features of the trial program are summarized below.
(1) The halibut fishery would remain open over the eight-month season from
March through October, retaining the IPHC closures designed to protect
halibut migration between fishing areas.
(2) Each individual vessel with a limited entry license would receive an allo-
cation specified as a share of the total allowable catch. Shares were assigned
so that 70 percent was based upon the vessel's fishing performance between
1986-1989 and the remainder was associated with the vessel's length. Dis-
putes were resolved with an appeal board.
(3) An observer company and a team of Halibut Fishery Officers (HFOs) were
hired to monitor and enforce the program. The system is self-funded (C$.09/
lb in 1993). Fishermen notify the observer company of their intent to fish
(hail out) and probable landing date (hail in) and port and then upon landing,
an observer validates weights and debit amounts from a centralized com-
' For details about alternative allocation proposals and events leading up to consensus, see
Turris 1994.216 Casey, Dewees, Turris, and Wilen
puter. Stiffer penalties for violations were enacted, including forfeiture of
quota.^
(4) During the first two trial years, quotas were not allowed to be transferred
while the HAB studied the implications of stacking. In 1993, limited trans-
ferability was allowed. Each vessel's initial allocation was allowed to be
split into two equal sized units and holders may now lease out or lease up
to two units from others (maximum aggregation of four units).
The British Columbia IQ program is unique in many respects. First, it was
implemented in a fishery which had backed itself into an extremely untenable long
run situation, with (1) fishing conducted over a frenzy of activity which involved
high financial and physicai risk to fishermen. (2) producing a low valued product,
and (3) increasingly placing the fishery at biological risk due to over harvesting.
Second, the British Columbia fishery implemented IQs as a pilot program side by
side with the alternative open access which continued in the Alaskan fishery. This
made it easy to compare the pros and cons of the new system because the status
quo was readily visible in Alaska. Third, the IQ program was almost wholly
industry designed with minimal assistance other than facilitation by the govern-
ment. In the end, the ultimate design refiected the concerns and wishes of the
majority of the license holders. Fourth, the system was not fully opened up to
unlimited transfers of quota. This reflected the concerns and uncertainties of the
industry and the modified system incorporates a "go slow" approach to capturing
the efficiency. The issues of transferability and consolidation have been important
in the design phase of many IQ programs and the B.C. decision to first freeze and
then moderately relax constraints on transfers is unique.
Methods
During September 1993, Dewees and Casey conducted in-person interviews with
12 of the 14 primary halibut processors identified by the Department of Fisheries
and Oceans (DFO). These 12 processors handled approximately 80 percent of the
1993 halibut landings according to DFO statistics. The questionnaire consisted of
35 questions. The interviews were used to collect data on (I) characteristics of the
halibut processing industry, (2) product types, (3) marketing and distribution, and
(4) IVQ problems and benefits. To minimize antagonisms, we made it clear to
interviewees we were not associated with DFO and we assured interviewees of
confidentiality. The interviews generally took one to two hours to complete.
In Spring 1994, we conducted a mail survey of all 435 licensed British Colum-
bia halibut fishers. The questionnaire, with a cover letter from DFO. consisted of
^ In an effort to deter violations, new and increased fines have been enacted. In addition,
the Minister of Fisheries has shown a willingness to suspend the halibut fishing privilege of
anyone flagrantly abusing the program. In 1991. the Minister suspended for the 1992 halibut
fishery the fishing privilege of a vessel that failed to report its landed catch. The informa-
tion about this vessel's activity came from industry participants and the suspended vessel's
1992 IQ was divided among all other halibut license holders. See Turris (1994) for a further
discussion of enforcement issues including a description of some self-enforcement aspects
of the program. Also, E.B. Economics (1993) provides an evaluation of enforcement and
monitoring based on convictions and pending charges incurred in the 1991 and 1992 fishing
seasons and a survey in which halibut fishermen were asked to rate the degree of program
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21 questions to coilect data on (I) halibut harvesters and their vessels. (2) quota
allocations. (3) changes in fishing under IVQs. and (4) opinions about IVQs.
Whenever possible, questions were taken directly or adapted from a related ITQ
socioeconomic study (Dewees 1989). The questionnaire was pretested with 20
halibut harvesters to identify vague questions, potential sources of bias and typ-
ical ranges of answers. The original questionnaire was followed up with a re-
minder letterandan additional questionnaire to maximize return rate (Dillman 1978).
A total of 135 mail questionnaires were completed (31 percent).
Additional data on the halibut industry were supplied by the Canadian De-
partment of Fisheries and from an earlier report prepared for DFO (E.B. Eco-
nomics 1993).
Results and Discussion
Several dramatic changes have occurred in the British Columbia halibut fishery
since the IVQ program began in 1991. Most notable, are changes in landing pat-
terns and ex-vessel prices. Under IVQs. B.C. halibut landings are spread out over
an eight month period. This is in sharp contrast to the pre-IVQ pattern of taking
the TAC in two short derby openings. Figure 2 shows British Columbia and
Alaska monthly landings patterns for 1989. Note that the bars are percents of each
country's total landings taken by month. This pattern typifies the pre-IVQ period
when the seasonal opening for British Columbia were set at intervals different
from Alaska. The intent of the IPHC in setting several seasonal openings through-
out the year was to try to spread out the supply of halibut into the market.
However, the seasonal opening and the TAC allotted to those openings still re-
sulted in large volumes of halibut entering the market in short periods throughout
the year, especially in June and September when there are major openings in
Alaska. In contrast. Figure 3 shows the landing patterns for British Columbia and
Alaska during 1993. British Columbia's landings are spread out over the entire
fishing season and there is very little halibul landed by British Columbia during
Alaska's main seasonal openings.
The low volume of British Columbia halibut coming in throughout the year
enabled processors to sell 94 percent of (he product as fresh. This resulted in a
B.C.=10.4 million lbs
U.S. =56.5 million Ibs
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Figure 3.
higher ex-vessel price for halibut."* Table I compares the average annual Alaskan
ex-vessel price with the average annual British Columbia ex-vessel price for two
time periods. 1988-90 and 1991-93. The price differential of US $O.22/lb between
the two countries in the pre IVQ period 1988-90 is largely attributed to the extra
transportation costs associated with shipping Alaskan halibut to secondary whole-
sale markets, mainly in Seattle {E.B. Economics 1993). The price differential
during the IVQ period is substantially larger, particularly in 1992 and 1993. The
increase reflects the fact that practically all of the British Columbia halibut is now
sold throughout the year as fresh where as Alaskan halibut is still predominately
sold in the frozen market. Averaged over the 1988-90 pre IVQ period, British
Columbia halibut carried a 15% premium {US$/lb .22) over their Alaska counter
parts in the ex-vessel market. Over the post IVQ period (1991-93), this premium
increased to 70% (US$/lb .99). Thus, there is evidence of an ex-vessel price gain
associated with IVQs of about 55% (USS/lb .77).
Table 1





































' Weekly market demand for fresh halibut appears to become sharply inelastic once a
certain volume is reached. As one processor described it. "There is a pipe iine for fresh
halibut going into Ihe U.S. that can only accommodate so much halibut in a given vveek.
Once that pipeline is full any product left over has to be frozen." In the pre-IVQ days, the
pipe line was filled quickly, with most of the product having to be frozen. Under the IVQ
system, landings in any week are low enough to be sold almost entirely as fresh."IVQs in the B.C. Halibut Fishery" 219
Changes in the Processing Sector
IVQ implementation in the halibut fishery in 1991 led to some significant changes
in the processing sector. Some of the changes measured in our interviews are
summarized in Table 2.
A major change is the switch in the proportion of halibut marketed fresh from
429? in the pre-IVQ period to 94% in the IVQ period. The U.S. remains the
primary market for fresh halibut (89%) with most of the product going to large
Pacific coast cities. Several processors indicated increased efTorts to market fresh
halibut in the eastern U.S., Canada and Europe. About one-half (51%) of the
frozen British Columbia halibut stays in Canada with the rest (49%) being mar-
keted in the U.S.
The interviewees indicated that there was a transfer in market share from large
traditional firms to smaller firms specializing in halibut. Five of the 12 firms
interviewed increased their halibut processing volume but these were relatively
small firms. Three firms decreased their volume processed and these were rela-
tively large firms. On average the processors interviewed are purchasing halibut
from fewer vessels. This appears to be due to some reduction in number of vessels
fishing for halibut (consolidation of quota shares) and an increase in the number
of firms purchasing halibut. Half the processors felt that the quality of fresh
halibut was the same as before IVQs. Those who felt quality had improved at-
tributed it to fishermen having more time to properly care for fish onboard. Two
processors felt that quality was worse because of longer trips taken by some
fishermen.
Table 2
Marketing Changes Since IVQs as Reported by 12 Major British Columbia
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Fresh halibut marketed in the U.S.







Additional changes in the processing sector are evident when our survey data
and qualitative analysis of processor interviews is augmented with DFO and E.B.
Economics (1993) data. Specifically, there is evidence of a shift in industry con-
centration, new firms entering the market, and changes in the locations of land-
ings.
In the years just prior to the IVQ system (1986-1990), the majority of British
^ Unusually high U.S. ex-vessel prices occurred during the September halibut opening in
the Gulf of Alaska causing the 1991 average price to be exceptionally high. High September
prices are attributed to low halibut cold storage holdings. Cold storage holdings at the end
of August, 1991 were approximately 5.2 million pounds compared to 14.7 million pounds in
August of 1990 (Seafood Trend Newsletter 9/30/91).
' Not coincidentally, all five of these believed IVQs made them "better off' where as other
processors (who lost volume) believe they are "worse ofi"" under IVQs.220 Casey, Dewees, Turris, and Wilen
Columbia's halibut was purchased by large salmon processors located in Prince
Rupert and the lower mainland of British Columbia. Typically, these firms derived
the majority of their earnings from salmon production with halibut constituting a
small portion of their total sales revenues. The halibut industry was moderately
concentrated during this period. Three firms had halibut purchases that individ-
ually amounted to more than iO percent of the total British Columbia halibut catch
and the average market share of the top four firms combined over this five year
period was approximately 49 percent (DFO data 1986-1990).
Concentration in the halibut market during this pre-IVQ period appears to be
the result of two factors. First, prior to the IVQ program, the substantial capital
needed for handling halibut may have made it difficult for undercapitalized firms
to compete with the larger salmon processors. In derby fisheries, large volumes of
halibut come into a processing plant at once necessitating large freezing and
handling capacity and {in some cases) the financial ability to hold an inventory to
sell during the rest of the year.
Secondly, firms having a large share in the halibut market during this period
often had a large share in the salmon market and were able to purchase halibut
from their regular salmon boats. In the salmon market, fishermen generally sell to
the same buyer every year. This is especially true in the saimon canning market
(Pinkerton 1987). Several halibut processors we interviewed explained that fish-
ermen generally prefer to sell halibut to the same processors they sell to in the
salmon fishery.
Under the IVQ program, a substantial number of smaller, less capitalized firms
have entered the halibut processing sector. New entry appears to be the result of
a shift from a predominately frozen market to a predominately fresh market. In a
fresh market, halibut buyers no longer need a large freezing/storage facility or the
financial ability to hold inventories for long periods. Under new conditions, mar-
gins are made by creating and exploiting niches in the fresh market, which is
potentially viable year round. Prior to the IVQ program, on average 57 processing
firms purchased halibut each year. Under the IVQ program an average of 69 firms
are active in the halibut market (DFO data 1991-93). Most of the new firms have
market shares of less than I percent (Table 3).
There also have been some significant changes in industry concentration (Ta-
ble 3). Most notably, one relatively new and specialized halibut buyer who had a
modest market share prior to the IVQ program now buys approximately a third of
the total British Columbia halibut catch. This firm focuses almost exclusively on
halibut. The next three top buyers all have individual market shares of less than
Table 3
Average Market Share and Number of Firms Processing British Columbia
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10 percent atid the total average market share for these four top firms during this
period is approximately 55 percent compared with the pre-IVQ figure of 49 per-
cent. This concentration ratio is somewhat misleading, however, since it is heav-
ily influenced by the one new dominant firm. Excluding this one firm, the industry
appears to be less concentrated with no other firms having more than 10 percent
market share (compared with 3 before IVQs) and 52 firms having less than I
percent market share (compared with 37 before IVQs).
The location of halibut landings has also changed under the IVQ program.
These changes were first documented by E.B. Economics (1993). which reports
that prior to IVQs (1983-1990). two regions, the Lower Mainland and Prince
Rupert accounted for approximately 90 percent of British Columbia's total land-
ings wilh no other region accounting for more than 5 percent. Since IVQs (1991-
1992). the authors report that Tive regions had landings of 5 percent or more while
landings in the two major regions, the Lower Mainland and Prince Rupert, fell
significantly. Landings in the Prince Rupert region fell from 35 percent to 25
percent and landings in the Lower Mainland fell from 53 percent to 41 percent.
This shift may have occurred because freezing facilities are for the most part no
longer needed in the fishery and halibut can now be landed in many more ports.
Another notable change occurred in the grading system for halibut. Prior to
IVQs. catch was sorted into several size categories, and there were separate
prices for each size grade with larger sized halibut receiving a higher price. How-
ever, the grading system varied from one processor to another with some proces-
sors sorting by 3 grades and others by 5 to 7 grades. Now. the norm is for a halibut
processor to offer fishermen a single price though the processor continues to sell
by size grades in the secondary market. The majority of processors interviewed
cited two reasons for the change to a single ex-vessel price. The first is a shift in
market demand from larger (over 40 lbs) to smaller (10-40 lbs) size halibut. This
shift is attributed to the transition to a predominately fresh market where larger
size halibut are in less demand.** The second explanation for a single ex-vessel
price is increased competition among processors. Almost all the processors we
interviewed described the halibut market under IVQs as being much more com-
petitive in terms of fishermen shopping for the best price. With processors using
different grading schemes, comparing price offers is complicated. A single price
enables a fisherman to quickly and accurately compare offers from different pro-
cessors.
Attributes of Halibut License Holders
The fishery sector is made up of largely experienced halibut fishermen, and none
of the respondents were less than 27 years old (Table 4). Eighty-seven percent are
married, and on average, support a household of 2 additional people. Only 66
percent reported partner income and the mean spouse/partner income was on
average C$17,562.
'^ Processors explained in the frozen market, most of the halibut is eventually steaked into
uniform portions. With this type of processing, there is a greater yield recovery from Iarge
halibut. Thus, fishermen were paid premiums for larger size grades of halibut. In the fresh
market, halibut is often shipped whole lo retailers who can then cut portions according to
customer's requests. Under this type of processing halibut size has little effect on yield
recovery, hence, buyers are less willing to pay premiums for larger fish.222 Casey, Dewees, Turris, and Wilen
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1994 monetary values are in Canadian dollars, at the time C$1.00 = US$0.80.
Two-thirds of the respondents owned small fishing vessels less than 45 feet in
length (Table 5). The majority of vessels were built in 1964-1983 which were years
of rapid expansion of Pacific Coast fishing fleets (Dewees and Hawkes. 1988). The
respondents estimated the value of their vessels and halibut gear (excluding li-
cense and quota), on average, to be C$236,920. Over three-quarters of the re-
spondents received 1993 halibut quota allocations between 10.000 and 40,000
pounds with an annual lease value of approximately C$1.50/pound.
The majority (70 percent) of respondents reported fishing their entire quota in
1993 and another 17 percent fished their entire quota and leased additional quota
shares. A smaller proportion (13 percent) leased out all or half of their quota
allocation (Table 5).^ Eighty-seven percent planned to fish all or part of their quota
during 1994 with very few pianning to leave the halibut fishery.
The halibut license owners, like many Pacific coast small vessel owners, par-
ticipate in several fisheries. Salmon is the primary fishery for many vessels, but
some also participate in other inshore fisheries (Table 6).
Changes in Fishing Practices
Economists and other analysts of quota programs have cited the potential benefits
to be gained by rationalization of fishing. Virtually all literature has focused on the
input savings expected from reducing incentives to "capital stuff' and from con-
solidation of fishing capital, although the literature has not been precisely clear
over whether we should expect dramatic changes in the configuration of vessels
or mostly consolidation and reduction in the number of vessels. In the years
preceding IVQs in British Columbia, the halibut fishery was characterized by
extreme overcapitalization, both in terms of numbers of vessels and in terms of
typical fishing practices. Typical practices under derby conditions were frantic,
with crew working virtually continuously regardless of conditions until each of the
short seasons were closed. We surveyed fishermen to determine how average
fishing trips and fishing practices changed as a result of quotas.
Surprisingly, there was no dominant pattern of changes as indicated by Table
^ In comparison, DFO data on 1993 leasing activities for the entire halibut fleet indicates 17
percent of the fleet leased out all of their quota and 2 percent leased out half their quota."IVQs in ihe B.C. Haiihul Fishery" 223
Table 5
Characteristics of 135 British Columbia Halibut Harvesting Business Mai!
Survey Respondents, 1994
Vessel length (feet) Percent
vessel length < 35 U
35 ^ vessel length < 45 56
45 ^ vessel length < 55 22
^ ^ vessel length II
Value of vessel and halibut gear* Percent
value « 100.000 33
100.000 < value =e 300,000 63
300,000 < value 35
Halibut IVQ allocation in 1993 (pounds) Percent
Quota < 10.000 7
10.000 ^ Quota < 20.000 43
20.000 ^ Quota < 40,000 34
40.000 « Quota < 60,000 10
60.000 ^ Quota 4





Use of halibut quota in 1993 Percent
Fished entire allocation 70
Fished entire allocation and leased additional 17
Leased entire allocation (-2 shares) 8
Leased half of allocation (= I share) 5
1994 Plans Percent
Fish some or all of quota 87
Retire j
Switch to non-halibut fisheries 2
Switch to non-fishing activities |
Other 9
" Monetary values are in Canadian dollars; at the time. C$1.00 = US$0.80.
7. We would expect changes in fishing practices to be the result of two aspects of
the IVQ program, the size of a vessel's quota allocation (relative to previous
derby catches) and increased freedom in choosing the pace, location and timing of
fishing.** The formula used in allocating quota, resulted in a significant reappor-
** Though we did not ask fishermen to describe the factors they consider in determining
"when" to fish their quota, our interviews with processors suggests that fishermen are
timing their halibut trips according to their expectation of ex-vessel price and their oppor-
tunities in other fisheries. For instance, many of the processors we interviewed reported
that it is quite common for fishermen to call processors before deciding to make a halibut224 Casey, Dewees, Turris, and Wilen
Table 6























tionment of the TAC among fishing vessels. Because most of the allocation was
based on a vessel's best annual catch over a 4 year period (1986-1989). vessels
with consistently high annual landings received the same quota allocation as same
sized vessels having only one similarly successful year. Consequently, highliners
tended to receive quota allocations significantly less than their previous derby
landings and vessels with sporadic catch history received relatively more quota.
Though the introduction of transferability in 1993 allowed fishermen to adjust
their quota holdings, obtaining an optimal quota holding may have been difficult
given the restrictions on quota trading.^ Thus, some vessel owners may have
adjusted their fishing practices based on their initial allocation and whatever lim-
ited adjustments to quota holdings they could make. There has been little change
in fishing travel distance, and the majority of fishermen report either no change or
reductions in the total number of trips per season and average harvest per trip.
Finally, most fishermen report either no change or reduction in average days at
sea per trip and harvest per trip. These results are probably due to the new
emphasis on higher quality landed fish since maximizing quantity in a short period
is no longer necessary under the slower paced quota system.
Table 7
Changes in fishing practices after introduction of IVQs in British Columbia
halibut fishing, 1993
Category n More Same Less
Number of trips per season
Average days at sea per trip
Average harvest per trip
Average harvest per day at sea
Average distance from port
trip and elicit the processor's expectations of prices in the coming week. Also, both pro-
cessors and DFO report fishermen frequently utilize an information hot-line provided by
DFO that reports the number of halibut boats currently out on the grounds. In terms of
timing halibut trips around opportunities in other fisheries, almost all processors reported
buying very little halibut during salmon openings because most halibut fishermen had
switched over to salmon fishing.
"^ Recall that each vessel's quota allocation could be split into two shares and traded with
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Changes in Crew and Share System
Since quotas reduce the individual vessel's risk associated with short derby open-
ings and give new incentives for more orderly fishing, we expected smaller crew
sizes. Our survey findings in Table 8 show some moderate move towards small
crew sizes, with 44 percent reducing crew size (most by one crew member) and no
respondents reporting increasing crew sizes. Based on our survey and additional
data provided by DFO. we estimate the total reduction in the number oC crew
members employed by the fishery to be 32 percent. This is composed of an
estimated 189f reduction in crew size on those vessels active in the fishery in 1993
and crew displaced from non-active vessels (an estimated 14%).
We anticipated that the remuneration system under the IVQ program will
undergo realignment as the new system settles into its long term patterns, al-
though in ways difficuh to predict a priori. First, total crew labor input needs are
changing. Generally, less crew labor is required on each typical trip because the
pace of fishing has slowed. In addition, there has been consolidation so that fewer
vessels are participating. At the same time, more total crew hours are probably
being expended per vessel season since there is more consolidation of quota and
expansion of total participation by those remaining. Hence although fewer num-
bers of laborers are being utilized, those remaining may be working longer sea-
sons. Second, the existence of quota with a positive value should produce incen-
tives to alter the share system to provide a payment for the opportunity cost of the
quota itself. The manner in which this might be refiected is also difficult to predict,
particularly since quota, vessel, and gear shares are often convoluted when ves-
sels are operated by skipper/owners.
As discussed above, we found that 44 percent of the respondents reduced crew
sizes. For the most part (59 percent) individual crew shares increased on those
vessels operating with fewer crew members (Table 8). Thus remaining crew mem-
bers seem to be made better off under the increased values being generated by the
system. We did not examine the employment adjustments of crew members dis-
placed from the fishery. Since most halibut crew members also work in other
fisheries, displaced halibut crew members may seek to increase their level of
participation in other fisheries or seek additional on-shore employment. A more
complete analysis of the total impact on crew members thus should account for
displaced crew members (i.e. re-employment, opportunity costs etc.). For vessels
reporting no adjustment to crew size (approximately 50 percent), most (76 per-
cent) kept individual crew shares the same. Those who kept crew size the same
but changed the individual shares universally reduced them. Two vessel owners
created a separate share for quota and eight chose to recover quota costs by
adjusting the combined share of skipper and vessel.
All of these changes in both crew size and in the remuneration system reflect
a system still in considerable fiux. Since consolidation has been restricted, we
would expect only moderate changes in actual crew sizes and this is mostly borne
out by the survey. At the same time, the quota system should be adapting to
reflect changes in relative shares going to the total crew, skipper, and vessel in
order to accommodate the newly created capital values in quota shares. It should
be kept in mind that in this particular fishery some of this structural change in the
share system may have already occurred during the limited entry program to226 Casey, Dewees, Turris, and Wilen
Table 8
Changes in Crew Employment and Individual Crew Share in British Columbia
Halibut Fishery, 1993
Changes in Crew Employment
Percent
Same number of crew 56
Less one crew member 33
Less two crew members 7




Those reporting reducing crew size S? 28 13
Those reporting same crew size 0 76 24
accommodate the capital value of limited entry permits. During the more lucrative
years of the limited entry program, halibut licenses traded for values in the range
of $1,500-2,000 per foot of vessel length. Hence adjustments that are taking place
in the share system now are really reflecting additional new rents being created
from the increase in ex-vessel prices brought about by marketing changes, as well
as additional values associated with cost savings, increased security, flexibility,
and control and planning capabilities generated by the more secure property rights.
Quota transfers
Under the British Columbia halibut IVQ system quota shares were not allowed to
be transferred during the first two years of the individual quota program {I99I-
92). In 1993, limited transfers of quota shares were allowed. Under the transfer
rule, quota shares can only be leased annually but a vessel cannot hold more than
four quota shares. Each vessel's initial allocation is divided into two equal shares
and a vessel owner can lease a maximum of two additional shares and/or lease out
a maximum of two shares. A maximum of four transfers are allowed to adjust the
vessel quota holdings. According to Department of Fisheries and Oceans data,
approximately 74 licensed halibut vessels were no longer actively fishing for hal-
ibut in 1993. We compared the characteristics of the vessels and vessel owners
who leased additional quota in 1993 with the characteristics of those who leased
out their quota share(s). The only significant difference between the two groups
was the size of the initial quota share allocation (Table 9). On average, the initial
allocation of those leasing additional quota in 1993 was significantly higher than
those leasing out quota to other halibut vessel owners. This may reflect economies
of scale or other incentives towards consolidation and may be indicative of what
might happen under a relaxation of rules against "stacking" quota."IVQs in the B.C. Halibut Fishery" 227
Table 9
Comparison of Initial IVQ Allocation of Halibut Vessel Owners Leasing
Additional Quota and Those Leasing Out Their Quotas, 1993
Vessels leasing Vessels leasing










" Means statistically different [modified t-test, assuming different variances between
groups (Satterthwaite 1946, referenced in Snedcor and Cochran 1980)].
Opinions about IVQs
Quota owners generally had positive opinions on most features of the British
Columbia halibut IVQ system (Table 10). The majority felt better off and more
secure about their retirement under IVQs. The majority also saw advantages of
better resource conservation and record keeping, as well as reductions in waste of
bycatch and gear loss. The majority did feel that IVQs make it more difficult for
young people to get into fishing. It is also interesting to note that 28 percent
disagreed that IVQs make fishing safer. Their comments indicated that some
harvesters would still take risks in rough weather if halibut prices are high.
In general, these opinions indicate a higher level of support for IVQs among
British Columbia halibut vessel owners than Dewees (1989) found among New
Zealand fishermen shortly after implementation of individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) in most of their inshore fisheries.
Table 10
Responses of Pacific Halibut License Holders to Statements about Attributes
of British Columbia's Individual Vessel Quota (IVQs).
Percent that 95%
agreed or Confid.
Statement strongly agreed^ Interval^
1 am better off under IVQs. 80 73 to 87
1 feel more secure about my retirement
under IVQs. 84 78 to 91
IVQs conserve halibut resources better than other
management techniques. 75 67 to 83
IVQs make it more difficult for young people to
get into fishing.
IVQs increase my enjoyment of fishing.
IVQs make fishing safer.
I lose less fishing gear under the IVQ system.
I waste less by catch under the IVQ system.
I maintain much better halibut log book records
under the IVQ system. 68 60 to 76
" Choice of responses were strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree.
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Summar)' and Conclusions
The British Columbia Pacific halibut fishery has undergone some significant
changes since the introduction of individual vessel quotas in 1991. While British
Columbia fishermen are essentially landing the same annual volume of halibut
under the IVQ program, the timing of landings has changed dramatically. Instead
of large volumes coming onto the market in two to three short derby openings,
British Columbia's TAC is landed more gradually over an eight-month period.
Under the IVQ program, fishermen are timing their halibut fishing trips according
to the market price of halibut and their opportunities in other fisheries. The slower
pace of landings has allowed processors to develop new market opportunities year
round and sell essentially all of the halibut landed as fresh. The shift from pre-
dominately frozen to fresh product has caused a substantial increase in the ex-
vessel price of British Columbia halibut. Additional changes have occurred in
both the halibut processing sector and fishing sector.
In the processing sector, the number of firms buying halibut has increased
substantially. Processors interviewed attributed new entry to the lower capital
requirements for handling fresh halibut and to new opportunities for firms to
establish niche markets. Halibut processors can also buy halibut from a much
wider range of ports as there is no longer a need to land halibut in a port with a
large freezing facility. As a result, landings have become less concentrated geo-
graphically.
Some important changes in the halibut fishing sector are a reduction in the
number of participating vessels, changes In crew employment, and changes in
vessel share systems. In 1993. 73 vessels leased out all of their quota and another
vessel had its quota suspended leaving 361 vessels active in the fishery. Nearly
one-half of vessel owners reported eliminating at least one crew member under the
IVQ program although for those vessels reducing crew size, the individual shares
of the remaining crew members generally increased. Since owning fishing quota
presents a new opportunity cost for vessel owners, we expected the remuneration
system to move towards recovery of some of the cost of using quota. Currently,
25 percent of those reporting no change in crew size reported reducing individual
crew shares, presumably to accommodate the opportunity costs of quota.
In general, vessel owner's opinions toward the IVQ program are quite posi-
tive. Mostfishermenreport being better off under the IVQ program and feel IVQs
conserve halibut resources better than previous management systems. However,
most fishermen felt IVQs make it more difficult for young people to get into
fishing and a substantial minority (28 percent) feel that IVQs do not make fishing
safer.
Future Changes
Critical issues that are likely to have a significant effect on the British Columbia
halibut fishery are potential changes in transferability restrictions and the intro-
duction of ITQs in the U.S. Pacific halibut fishery. The current transfer restric-
tions of a maximum of four quota shares per vessel has. as was intended, limited
fieet consolidation. Whether the current transfer restrictions will remain in future
management plans is a contentious issue among halibut fishermen. Some fisher-
men would like to see quota share ownership caps increased or eliminated while"IVQs in the B.C. Halibut Fishery" 229
others prefer lower caps or no transferability at all. If transfer restrictions are
relaxed or eliminated in future management plans, capitalization in the fishery
could change significantly. Under the current quota transfer restrictions, fisher-
men cannot acquire enough quota to make halibut fishing their sole source of
income and hence for most boats, halibut fishing is still a supplemental fishery to
salmon. As a result, vessel characteristics such a vessel size and horsepower may
be more attributable to capital needs in the salmon fishery than in the halibut
fishery. If quota transfer restrictions are relaxed and the fleet becomes increas-
ingly consolidated, halibut fishing may, for the fishermen remaining in the fishery,
become their sole source of revenues, in which case, halibut fishermen may
switch to vessels with characteristics that are better suited for halibut longlining
and alter fishing practices.
The second issue likely to have a dramatic impact on the British Columbia
halibut fishery Is the introduction in the 1995 fishing season of an individual quota
program in the much larger U.S. Pacific halibut fishery. Since 1991 British Co-
lumbia halibut fishermen have avoided the drop in fresh halibut prices that occurs
when iarge volumes of Alaskan halibut comes on the market by not landing halibut
during the weeks around the U.S. halibut openings. Avoiding direct competition
with U.S. fresh halibut is no longer possible with the U.S. fishery operating under
individual quotas. Competition from large U.S. fresh supplies will certainly result
In lower ex-vessei halibut prices for British Columbia fishermen. The degree of
this price decrease will depend on the price elasticity of demand for fresh halibut
and the ability of the seafood industry to expand markets for fresh halibut. The
British Columbia halibut industry will still have the advantage of lower transpor-
tation costs than Alaska given their closer location to U.S. markets.
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